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The article provides an analysis of the changing role of 
elected regional governments in regional policy making in 
Poland from their creation in 1998 until 2013. The ana-
lysed period shows the gradual empowerment of regional 
governments, initially established as politically, function-
ally and financially very weak institutions. The change is 
explained through the process of Europeanization, and in 
particular through their expanding role in the management 
of EU structural funds. The situation in Poland is charac-
terised by a much weaker position of regional governments 
than is the case in other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. The article also raises the question of the role of 
regions following the end of the EU 2014–2020 financial 
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perspective, calling for a reinvention of the role of regional 
institutions, and suggesting that the lack of long-term vi-
sion may result in a rapid decrease of the political profile 
of regions, to a level similar to that observed at the end of 
the 20th century. 
Key words: Europeanization, Poland, Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), regionalisation, regions, regional policy, 
structural funds
1. Introduction 
The contemporary history of Polish regional governments is relatively 
short. They were created in the 1998 reform as very weak entities – with 
highly limited functions and even more scarce financial resources. Yet 
their importance in domestic politics grew significantly in the following 
years. This article argues that the main drive for this growth might be at-
tributed to their role in the implementation of European regional policies, 
and in particular to the decisions on the institutional shape of Regional 
Operating Programmes. However, it is not clear what the vision of Polish 
regions is after 2020, when their role as the »ministries of European gifts« 
for localities will most probably be over. The regions have to be reinvented 
and have to reinvent themselves.
The connection between the expanding role of Polish regions and EU ac-
cession, as well as the management of EU funds, directs our attention to 
the concept of Europeanization (more extensively discussed in Swianie-
wicz, 2013). The nature of the expected EU impact at the regional and 
local level has been extensively discussed in literature concerning Western 
European countries (Goldsmith, Klausen 1997; Tofarides, 2003; Leonar-
di, 2005; Frank et al., 2006; Hamendinger, Wolfhardt, 2010). But there 
has been much less systematic observation of the extent to which the 
processes noted in new member states recall the earlier (and sometimes 
parallel) experience of the western part of the continent. The existing 
analyses concentrate mostly on the impact at the state level (e.g. Grabbe, 
2003) or on the pre-accession period and its relationship with regional 
policies (e.g. Keating, Hughes, 2003). There are a few case studies, such 
as Budapest (Tosics, 2010) and Ljubljana (Pichler-Milanović, 2010), or 
the interesting study of EU impact on regionalisation in Central-East-
ern and South-Eastern Europe (Bachtler, McMaster, 2008; Bache et al., 
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2011), but English-language literature still contains very few analyses 
which would include a more comprehensive reflection.1
The paper addresses in particular the analysis of the learning process-
es prompted by the EU (Radaelli, 2003) and the extent of EU impact 
(Börzell, Risse, 2003; Bache, 2008). Radaelli (2003) made a very useful 
distinction between thin and thick learning processes. A similar distinc-
tion is made between absorption, accommodation and transformation 
(Börzell, Risse, 2003) as levels of Europeanization. This paper will refer 
to these distinctions. 
The framework used in this paper refers to the concept of Börzell and 
Risse (2003) on the one hand, while at the same time it attempts to view 
the adaptation of regional governments through three perspectives: (1) 
change in the structure of public administration; (2) change in the hierar-
chy of goals and priorities in regional government policies; and (3) change 
in the style of policy preparation and policy implementation.
The empirical part draws upon the results of research projects conducted 
within the 2008–2012 period.2
The first section of the article provides an illustration of the »creeping re-
gionalisation« of Poland, showing the gradual growth of the political sig-
nificance of regions. The second section discusses their current role in the 
implementation of regional policies, demonstrating both similarities to 
other CEE countries and the unique position of Polish regions compared 
to those in neighbouring countries. Finally, the third section, by reference 
to the theoretical concepts of Europeanization, focuses our attention on 
the broader impact of EU cohesion policies on the organisational culture 
of Polish regions.
1  Such a conceptual reflection in the Polish language was published by Lackowska 
(2011). 
2  Factors differentiating implementation of the Integrated Regional Operating Pro-
gramme (grant from the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, research conducted in 
2008-2010); Local government beneficiaries of Sectoral Operating Programmes (grant no. 
DKS/BDG-II/POPT/179/11 from the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, research 
conducted in 2011-2012).
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2. The Impact on Regional Reforms – The Crawling 
Decentralisation of Polish Regional Reform
The whole set of decentralisation reforms implemented in Poland first in 
1990/1991 and then in 1998/1999 granted a wide range of functions to 
municipal governments, while the lists of county and regional functions 
are much shorter. This is illustrated by Figure 1, showing the role of in-
dividual tiers in public budget spending. In the years just following the 
reform the share of regions in sub-national budget spending was just over 
5 per cent; in subsequent years this increased considerably, but in 2012 it 
was still less than 9 per cent, while the share of large cities (cities of county 
status) was over 35 per cent and the share of remaining municipalities – 
over 43 per cent.
This is associated with the fact that the role of regional government in 
the direct delivery of services is very limited. The most important service 
functions include: maintenance and construction of regional roads, organ-
isation of regional railway services, and organisation of the health service 
at the regional level (in this last case the role of regions is limited to main-
tenance of infrastructure and organisational/management decisions. The 
current costs of health care are covered by the contracts between hospi-
tals and the national health insurance fund). However, the main function 
of regions is not related to service provision, but to strategic planning and 
regional development programmes. 
Figure 1. Public budget expenditures in Poland in 2012 in billion PLN
Source: author’s calculations based on data from www.stat.gov.pl 
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The reform has not introduced a considerable regionalisation of the pub-
lic finance system either. Unlike municipal governments – who enjoy a 
limited power of taxation and who to a considerable extent are financed 
by their own taxes – regions rely on transfers from the state and (increas-
ingly) European budgets, as well as on shares in personal and corporate 
income taxes – they receive 1.6 per cent of PIT and 15.9 per cent of CIT 
revenues collected within their territory. Moreover, most of the grants 
feeding the regional budgets are specific rather than general purpose 
transfers. Thus the reform created a new regional actor who was very weak 
– both functionally and financially – and was initially also weak in terms of 
its political position against local and central-level political actors.
The current system of sub-national governments assumes the existence 
of the three tiers with no vertical subordination among these. However, 
the implementation of EU regional policies and absorption of structural 
funds produces clear inter-relations among the tiers, and – as is shown 
in the following sections – places regional governments in a position of 
privilege in internal power relations.
The issue of future integration with the EU was often used by the pro-
ponents of the 1998 reform, who argued that only large regions could 
be economically competitive in the future European market and could 
become stronger partners of Western European counterparts, especially 
the German Länder. Some proponents claimed that regional reform was 
one of the conditions of access to EU structural funds, but this claim 
was not entirely justified. Also, as Hughes et al. (2003) observe, »the 
final shape of the reform should be seen as an inherently endogenous 
development«. 
Similar reforms were introduced a few years later (2000) in the Czech Re-
public and in Slovakia, where the self-governing kraj level has supplement-
ed the structure of sub-national governments (14 regions in the Czech 
Republic and 8 in Slovakia; Illner, 2011; Čapková, 2011). In Bulgaria re-
gional reform has never been implemented, in spite of having been envis-
aged in the Constitution (Kandeva, 2001). In Hungary and Romania the 
upper tier of sub-national government (megye and judets respectively) has 
not changed its spatial shape since 1990, although at least in Hungary its 
role has been marginalised (Horváth, 2000). 
However, the biggest difference between Polish and other countries’ up-
per level of sub-national government is that Poland is the only country in 
the region in which an administrative region would become a European 
NUTS-2 level region. Since NUTS-2 is a basic unit of European regional 
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policy, this has had very serious consequences for the regionalisation of 
cohesion policy implementation in Poland. 
In 1998 the new regional institutions were granted a very limited set of 
functions and even more limited financial resources, but the mere fact 
of their establishment created a new political dynamism. Regional gov-
ernments became involved in lobbying to strengthen their position and 
proved themselves able to mobilise public opinion and fight for further 
decentralisation. Their designation as NUTS-2 regions was a result of 
their successful lobbying. In the 2004–2006 Integrated Regional Operat-
ing Programme (IROP) this role was moderated by the fact that the goals 
and structure of the IROP were identical across the country, and regional 
governments had an extremely weak impact on policy preparation. But 
regional governments played a dominant role in the selection of individ-
ual projects to be financed, although this process was still controlled by 
the regional governor appointed by the national government (Lackowska, 
Swianiewicz, 2013). Nevertheless, the implementation of the 2004–2006 
cohesion policy was clearly more decentralised in Poland than in any of 
the other member states which joined the EU in 2004.
The further empowerment of regional governments was possible during 
the 2007-2013 period thanks to the effective mobilisation of public opin-
ion in support of decentralisation. The IROP was divided into 16 regional 
operating programmes (ROP), elaborated on by the regions themselves. 
The new law transferred decisions on project selection to regional execu-
tive boards. But this relatively clear logic was violated by the Polish Parlia-
ment, which decided to grant the governor the power to veto the regional 
governments’ selection of projects. This regulation was strongly criticised 
by several experts, as well as local and regional politicians (including the 
Association of Polish Regions), some of whom suggested that it might not 
comply with the Polish Constitution and/or EU regulations. After pow-
erful lobbying, the veto clause was eventually removed from the Polish 
legislation a few months later.
The role of regional governments has grown gradually, strengthening their 
position both against the central and the local (municipal) tiers (the latter 
being increasingly dependent on the region’s decisions on the allocation 
of EU funds to local projects). The process may be described as creeping 
decentralisation – a process in which individual changes were not very dra-
matic, but taken together they have transferred discretion over regional 
policy making from the central to the regional level. 
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3.  The Role of Regional Governments in the 
Absorption of EU Funds 
Bache et al. (2011) argue that in the accession period of CEE countries 
the EU Commission initially sought to advance regionalisation and the 
role of regions in the absorption of structural funds. However, »... the 
position of regions is diversified among the NMSs, depending on the 
developments and traditions in domestic politics« (Bachtler, McMaster, 
2008: 127). In the study by Bache et al. (2011: 135–136), for all the ana-
lysed cases (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia) the authors conclude that 
»we find a resilient central state that adapts to the changing policy envi-
ronment to retain a pivotal role in key decision areas«. The situation in 
Poland seems to be very distinct – it is the only NMS in which the ROP 
is managed by the elected regional government. Moreover, in Poland the 
regional programmes constitute a larger share of the total volume of EU 
funds compared to other countries. As Figure 2 demonstrates, Slove-
nia is the only exception to this rule; however the nature of the regional 
programme in this case is quite different, since it is a single programme 
managed on a central level. Besides Poland, the only countries with sev-
eral regional programmes in the 2007–2013 perspective were the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, but in their case the programmes were 
managed by special purpose authorities including representatives of cen-
tral and regional level governments. Romania and Bulgaria had an inte-
grated regional operating programme for the whole country, and the role 
of regional governments in Romania was much more limited than even in 
the Polish IROP 2004–2006. Bachtler and McMaster (2008) distinguish 
between four potential roles of regions in structural funds programmes: 
planning, management, implementation and final beneficiary. In the 
2004–2006 period the Polish regional governments contributed signifi-
cantly through the last two roles only, which as Bachtler and McMaster 
(2008: 412–13) show was still more prominent a role than in other CEE 
countries. However, in the 2007–2013 period they played a crucial role in 
all four dimensions.
For the 2014–2020 perspective, Poland plans to increase the share of 
ROPs to 39 per cent of the total allocation, while some other countries of 
the region plan to head in the opposite direction – for instance, Hungary, 
which has announced an intention to abolish ROPs altogether.
A summary of the variety of regional programmes, their management and 
relative importance in the absorption of EU funds is also provided in Ta-
ble 1. 
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Figure 2. The share of regional programmes in total EU operating pro-
grammes 2007–2013 
Source: author’s calculations based on EU Commission data
Table 1. Regional Operating Programmes in New Member States
Institutional structure for implementation
Elected regional 
government  
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Source: Swianiewicz et al., 2008
During the past decade the dominant perspective of the Europeanization 
discourse in Polish academic literature has been limited to access to EU 
funds. Somewhat infrequently it also referred to the necessity to comply 
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with EU standards and norms with regard to functions for which local 
governments are responsible. The new issue of regional policy was the fear 
of low absorption capacity – to what extent would available funds really 
be absorbed by local administrative structures? The ‘fetish of absorption’ 
may still be noticed in the discourse of urban politics, in which politicians 
concentrate on how much funds they were able to procure for their cities, 
while the effects of the undertaken projects are less frequently discussed 
and attract less public attention.
This perspective is more understandable upon considering the structure 
of sub-national investment spending. In Poland, while the share of EU 
funds in sub-national current expenditures did not exceed 4 per cent in 
social protection (and even less in other spending sectors) in 2010, in 
case of investment spending it was close to 40 per cent in communal 
infrastructure and 25 per cent in capital spending on transport infra-
structure.
The management of ROPs by regional governments in Poland is often 
seen as very successful. This is not only because they have proved efficient 
in terms of the absorption and disbursement rate, but also because they 
are perceived as efficient managers by the final beneficiaries of EU-fund-
ed projects. The perception of their performance in this respect is often 
better than is case of programmes which are managed at the central level 
(Figure 3). This does not concern, however, all dimensions of manage-
ment – the perception of project selection at the regional level is often 
seen as less transparent and more politicised than in centrally-managed 
operating programmes. The competition for ROP projects is usually much 
fiercer than in the case of centrally-managed OPs. Therefore, selecting 
from a vast range of similar projects makes transparent decision-making 
more difficult than in the case of the relatively limited range of applica-
tions for big projects in other OPs. 
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Figure 3. Assessment of managing institutions in various OPs (1–5 scale)
Source: Swianiewicz et al., 2013
Figure 4 shows the rate of dependency of sub-national investments on 
EU grants in various new member states. In most countries this grew 
from 2009 to 2011, reaching the highest figures in Bulgaria (over 60 per 
cent in 2011), Slovakia, Estonia and Romania. The lowest figures are 
found in Slovenia and the Czech Republic, but even in those cases EU 
grants provide close to 20 per cent of the total sub-national investment 
spending.
There is no doubt that the absorption of EU funds has dominated domes-
tic regional policies in most NMSs. At the beginning of century the Polish 
government tried to develop its own regional policy tool through a sys-
tem of regional contracts signed with regional governments (Swianiewicz, 
2004), but later the concept of contracts was overshadowed by structural 
funds, and the main effort of Polish public funds was directed towards se-
curing the matching input necessary for the absorption of resources avail-
able in the EU operating programmes. This is not in agreement with the 
theoretical assumptions of the EU cohesion policy, which assumes that 
it »... represents an addition to existing national regional policies rather 
than a substitute for national policies« (Leonardi, 2005: 18). In Poland 
the role of national policies is important in the sense that the allocation 
of funds among regions and among particular projects is to a huge extent 
a domestic decision. But as Grosse (2006: 151) notes, »... the system of 
Polish regional policy is focused on the absorption of EU funds«.
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Figure 4. Share of EU grants in local government investment spending
Note: no data available for Hungary for 2011
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of data gathered in interviews with Dobrinka Kr-
steva (BG), Tomas Kostelecky (CR), Miryam Vahtra (EST), Gabor Peteri (HU), Sorin Ioni-
ta (RO), Jan Bucek (SK), Krunoslav Karlovec (SI)
This situation observed in several NMSs is not unique in the history of 
the cohesion policy. As Leonardi (2005: 22–23) describes, »In 1992 the 
Amato government in Italy was forced to abolish the national regional 
policy for the South and used the available national funds to co-finance 
(with difficulty) the 50% level necessary for the cohesion policy’s national 
and regional operating programmes. In the four ‘cohesion’ countries – 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – the level of co-financing from the 
EU reached 75% of total expenditures, but even in these cases the nation-
al governments were hard pressed to come up with their additional 25%. 
Spending on regional development in the four less developed countries 
did increase dramatically – reaching over 5% of GDP in some cases – but 
this was largely due to the money transferred to national coffers from 
Brussels.«
But the data presented above do not tell us all about the depth of the 
changes induced by the implementation of the European cohesion policy 
at the regional and local level. 
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4.  Thin and Thick Learning in Regional 
Governments 
4.1.  Administrative Structures for Regional Policies  
The accession period and functioning within the structure of the EU led 
to several organisational changes in all tiers of public administration. In 
2005 a new Ministry of Regional Development was created, with the main 
goal of directing the proper absorption of EU structural and cohesion 
funds. At the regional level, separate units dealing with EU funds were 
established in all regional government offices and they are usually among 
the most powerful departments in the regional administration. 
However, there is limited evidence that these changes resulted in a more 
profound change in the organisational culture of the institutions involved. 
Following the Börzell and Rise definition, this change is something more 
than absorption; its permanent character suggests the use of the term 
accommodation. 
4.2. Goals (Priorities) of Regional Policies
The impact of Europeanization on formulating goals or regional policies 
is primarily influenced by the weakness of strategic planning, which is 
broadly discussed in the next section of this paper. Strategic goals are 
usually formulated in a very broad fashion, giving an opportunity to jus-
tify the grant application, whilst not providing a basis for the selection 
of individual projects. Considering this weakness, the strategies did not 
provide an adequate basis for the preparation of ROPs for the 2007–2013 
perspective.
The possibility of the regions developing programmes by themselves pro-
vides more opportunities for local projects to reflect a clearly formulated 
vision for the future development of the region. Yet, comparing the ROP 
documents, it is clear that the regions made only limited use of the free-
dom to create programmes by responding to the individual needs of a 
specific region. The ROPs are quite similar in their goals and formulated 
priorities, which indicates an unchanged attitude towards strategic doc-
uments.
The ROPs are not identical either. Even the sector which attracts the 
largest allocation of ROP funds is not the same in all 16 regions (Kru-
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kowska, 2013). In 13 regions this is transport infrastructure, whilst in the 
remaining 3 it is research and development. However, the differences are 
not very significant. Analysing the nine major areas of intervention, it is 
apparent that all are reflected in each of the ROPs. The only exception to 
this rule is the elimination of the urban regeneration axis from the Pod-
lasie Operating Programme. The average deviation of allocation from the 
national average – as calculated by Krukowska – differs from 0.6 to almost 
3 per cent.
There is no doubt that the discretion in shaping the ROPs is strongly 
limited by the guidance from Brussels and the Ministry of Regional De-
velopment, but it seems that the weakness of the selective strategies con-
tributes to their relative similarity. 
4.3. Styles of Policy Making and Policy Implementation 
The implementation of EU-funded projects often requires an adaptation 
to the EU model of policy making and policy implementation. The source 
of these rules may be found in the horizontal policies of the EU and/or 
in various documents adopted by the Commission. For example, with re-
gard to urban policies one may indicate the methodological assumptions 
of the URBAN initiative and several EU-level documents, such as the 
2000 Lille Agenda. Some dimensions of the promoted model are:
–  Integrated strategic planning: the necessity to demonstrate a re-
lationship between a planned activity and wider strategic goals, 
which requires earlier preparation of strategic documents. In 
the case of urban regeneration projects a specific kind of such 
a strategic approach concentrates on integrated neighbourhood 
projects, promoted since the URBAN initiative. Such an inte-
grated approach includes complex interventions covering econo-
mic, social, environmental and physical infrastructure aspects of 
neighbourhood regeneration;
–  Style of policy preparation including wide social consultations 
and various forms of community involvement;
–  Partnership in project implementation. In particular, this invol-
ves partnership of public institutions (which includes cooperation 
among government tiers, going along with the concept of multi-
level governance) and non-public actors (both local businesses and 
societal organisations). 
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It would be unjust to suggest that these ideas have appeared in Polish 
local and regional governments exclusively because of their involvement 
in the implementation of the EU cohesion policy. But there is no doubt 
that the appearance of EU funds has contributed to the wider popularity 
of the promoted model, and sometimes the mere application process was 
the main engine of their implementation. Examples of similar changes 
may be found in other countries of the region. Sootla and Kattai (2011: 
591) describe how access to EU funds facilitated the partnership style of 
policy making and professionalisation of the local government adminis-
tration in Estonia. Similarly, in Bulgaria EU integration has promoted the 
idea of inclusive policy making (Nikolova, 2011).
The depth of the changes was diversified. One may ask to what extent 
these ideas influence the consciousness of local staff and politicians, and 
how durable the changes in local government operating styles may be? As 
suggested by the cases discussed in following paragraphs of this paper, 
the thin learning process (a term suggested by Radaelli, 2003) has been 
dominant so far. Or, referring to the Börzell and Risse (2003) concept, 
the most typical is the absorption level, in which local governments try to 
access EU funds, but without a more substantial change in the modes of 
operation and goals of institutions which implement the projects. There 
are also exceptions to this rule, demonstrating deeper transformations in 
policy making and implementation.
The study of the implementation of the 2004-2006 IROP provides an 
excellent example of the issue discussed above. The obligation to prepare 
regional development strategies was introduced to the Polish legal system 
long before the take-off of the IROP, and was only very indirectly related 
to EU integration. However, access to EU structural funds has strongly 
dominated the way of thinking about strategic management. It was doc-
umented earlier (Swianiewicz et al., 2008, 2010) that the most frequent 
model of regional strategic planning differed very significantly from the 
theoretical assumptions rooted in New Public Management (NPM).
Many strategies try to define goals very broadly. Sometimes they cover 
the entire or almost the entire spectrum of functions delivered by the 
government that develops and adopts the programme. In this situation 
it is difficult to expect that the strategy would provide guidance for the 
implemented policies. Rather, it is a dead document, having little bearing 
on the daily activities of the administration and on key decisions. It should 
be emphasised that this form of document is sometimes adopted not be-
cause of a lack of skills or knowledge, but intentionally. The assumed role 
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of a strategy is often the key to obtaining as many grants as possible. Thus 
a ‘hunting’ document is created (for the purpose of grant hunting). Very 
broadly defined goals provide justification for almost every application for 
external funds under the strategy (and an indication of linkage with the 
strategy is often required by donors). Why indicate priorities, if we do not 
know in advance for what type of projects we will be able to get external 
support? By such reasoning, goal formulation (which seems to be wrong 
from the standpoint of an orthodox understanding of strategic manage-
ment adopted by those who developed this concept) appears reasonable, 
and even desirable. If the priority in the development programme is ‘al-
most everything’, then we are free to apply for any measures that appear 
on the horizon.
The ability to implement an own strategy for the region by means of the 
IROP was obviously limited, if only because it was a uniform program, 
implemented under an identical scheme throughout the country. Key ob-
jectives were defined at the national level and regional authorities had rel-
atively limited flexibility in adjusting the allocation of resources to the de-
velopment visions. In comparison to the funds transferred to the regions 
in the 2007-2013 perspective, these resources were also scarce. All of this 
does not mean that the selection of specific projects for implementation 
could not be linked with the priorities arising from the regional strategy. 
The idea was to link this vision with the IROP through ongoing discus-
sions within the regional steering committees, as well as final decisions 
taken by regional boards. We can also imagine the submission of project 
applications was consistent with the vision of regional development and 
inspired by regional governments’ offices.
In practice, however, as documented by empirical studies and in the opin-
ions of the main actors of regional policy making, the strategy was treated 
in a rather bureaucratic way – it served as a ‘support document’, and not 
one that directs regional development. In that sense the strategy was im-
portant as it supported applications for structural funds, but it was not 
difficult, since strategic goals were defined in a very broad way, enabling 
the justification of almost any project.
So what does success in IROP implementation, so often invoked by inter-
viewees, mean? It comes down to two things: (1) spending all or almost 
all of the granted resources and (2) avoiding ‘mishaps’ of a formal nature. 
Implementing projects that would have a significant impact on region-
al development in the most desirable direction was not foremost in the 
minds of regional and local politicians and officials when asked to de-
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scribe success. This is shown, for example, in a fragment of conversation 
with a member of the board of one of the surveyed regions: »I wanted to 
ask about your overall assessment of IROP implementation in the region. 
What was the greatest success, and what do you see as a failure? Although 
it was the first programme on such a large scale, we managed together 
with the beneficiaries to pull it off pretty well. There were no major ap-
peals or complaints about the decisions of individual bodies.« 
Given such an attitude we should maintain moderate criticism. To a large 
extent it is understandable. IROP was the first programme on such a scale 
to be implemented by the regional governments, thus they lacked experi-
ence and had to learn many things ‘on the fly’. The central authorities set 
out very complicated procedures and specific requirements for regions 
that go far beyond the formal rigour imposed by the EU.3 At the same 
time, the regional media were interested in uncovering and publicising 
striking cases of unused or poorly used funds. In the final stage of the pro-
gramme funds were sometimes awarded to projects from a ‘round-up’ (so 
long as applications did not contain formal errors). This was done in an 
attempt to avoid a low level of absorption at all costs. Therefore, all these 
drawbacks have rational explanations and justifications, but this does not 
change the fact that the observed practices differed significantly from the 
ideal strategic management of regional development. Thus the adoption 
of the strategic model of management remains the absorption rather than 
the transformation level of Europeanization.
The situation described above had an impact on the logic of the process 
of selecting projects for implementation under the IROP. The lack of stra-
tegic thinking meant the absence of guidance on the selection of projects 
resulting from the thought-out policies. When the politicians in power at 
the regional level were faced with the problem of using funds from the 
IROP, the tools at their disposal – in the form of previously developed 
strategies for regional development – could not help them, because they 
had been created for a completely different purpose. They were not treat-
ed as documents for the actual selection of investment priorities, but as 
‘supporting documents’. In making decisions on allocating resources from 
the IROP, the decision makers did not have any policy documents that 
would facilitate their job. The logic leading to the final selection of pro-
jects can be traced through the successive stages of the process.
3  Many authors have written about this excessive bureaucratisation and complexity 
of the process. Cf. Kozak, 2006; Grosse, 2004; Klimczak et al., 2006; Swianiewicz et al., 
2008.
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In the absence of priorities organising the process of generation and selec-
tion of priorities, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the selection 
was decided by other criteria. An important role among these was played 
by the applicant’s position in the network of social actors in regional poli-
cy. In other words, the access to key decision makers was important. This 
issue has been described in detail in earlier studies (Swianiewicz et al., 
2010; Bielecka, 2006; Bukowski, 2008). Figure 5 illustrates that those 
municipalities which were represented in formal IROP management in-
stitutions as well as municipalities where members of regional executive 
board came from were able to obtain larger grants than other local gov-
ernment units. Figure 6 also confirms that the issue of the position in the 
network of policy actors is not limited to the first years of the absorption 
of EU funds – the same phenomenon is visible in the ROP 2007-2013 
data.
In this sense, in the process of IROP implementation, a superficial pro-
cess of Europeanization can be observed. The sub-national actors have 
adapted to the formal requirements of EU programmes, but this adap-
tation was often superficial. This can be formulated even more harshly: 
EU policy has not changed the strategy and policy objectives of regions, 
because there was nothing to change – these goals and strategies existed 
only on paper.
Figure 5. Structural funds per capita in different types of municipalities 
(2004-2007, the average for 5 regions)











without representation in  
IROP institutions 
representative in RSC or RMC member of Regional  Board  
from gmina 
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Figure 6. Grants from regional operating programmes in gmina govern-
ments 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from www.mrr.gov.pl and websites of the regional 
operating programmes
Such an instrumental attitude towards strategic planning does not con-
cern only IROP implementation at the regional tier. One can also provide 
examples of cities in which capital investment programmes are treated 
more as preparation of a formal ‘support document’ for EU funding ap-
plications, rather than real management instruments increasing the effi-
ciency of policy making and implementation (see e.g. Purzyäski, 2011). 
The IROP procedures assumed the establishment of regional steering 
committees (RSCs), which would be an element of the partnership model 
of regional policy making. The idea of RSCs (and regional monitoring 
committees) was to set up a place to discuss visions for regional devel-
opment and to carry out a proper selection of projects, in line with those 
visions. In practice, however, most RSC members did not have adequate 
competences for such an assessment, were not interested in this kind of 
discussion and perceived their role differently.
The dominant role in the work of RSCs from most regions was played 
by the representatives of potential project beneficiaries – municipal and 
county governments. Representatives of professional bodies, employer 
associations and academic circles, co-opted to RSCs, mostly remained 
as extras in the game, which was, de facto, between local governments 
joined in territorial alliances (unless they fought for projects for their in-
stitutions).
Grants from Regional Operating Programmes in gmina (municipal) 
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The process of co-optation of RSC members from societal organisations 
had several weaknesses related both to the weakness of civic society (a 
small number of organisations, which would not only defend particular 
narrow interests, but would be ready to undertake responsibility for the 
co-production of regional policy; Bukowski et al., 2008) and to the low le-
vel of trust between regional governments and societal organisations (and 
cases of manipulation identified in the appointment of NGO representa-
tives to RSCs).
The only repeated trend in the quasi programme debates at RSCs was to 
strive for a relatively even distribution of resources among the different 
parts of a region. This resulted in a special understanding of the concept 
of sustainable development4 (very widely adopted by politicians at the re-
gional and local level) usually understood as the ‘even’ allocation of finan-
cial resources, in accordance with an adopted criterion, most often linked 
to the population.5 This approach had nothing to do with sustainable de-
velopment; it is an anecdotal example of the superficial adoption of con-
cepts relating to theories underlying the regional policy, and at the same 
time the use of certain words, which matched well the justification of the 
dispersal of resources to beneficiaries in different parts of the region.
RSCs were a highly imperfect attempt to implement the partnership 
principle of management. Their establishment may be interpreted as a 
structural change having the character of accommodation. But in spite of 
the fact that in some regions RSCs had a significant impact on the selecti-
on of projects to be financed from the IROP, it is hard to describe this as 
a transformation of the regional policy making style. 
5. Conclusion
The data provided in the paper prove that the change in regional polici-
es as a result of EU integration and access to EU funds is tremendous. 
Sub-national investments have become heavily dependent upon grants 
from structural funds, and this process concerns not only Poland but most 
4  The root of this misunderstanding comes from the terms in the Polish language. 
The Polish term for ‘sustainable development’ is almost the same as for ‘even development’. 
5  ‘Capitation’ was the term often used by interviewees demonstrating the popularity 
of this criterion, understood as the use of indicators and the distribution of grants in terms 
of their height per capita.
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NMSs. The vast majority of new projects which are seen as highly signifi-
cant by mayors would not have started in their current form if it had not 
been for access to EU funds.
Regional governments play an increasingly important role in the imple-
mentation of EU cohesion policies in Poland. There are no signs of mo-
ving towards a federal system; Poland remains and will remain a unitary 
state in the foreseeable future. However, it is an increasingly regional sta-
te, and using the terminology suggested by Loughlin (2001), it is beco-
ming more accurate to call it a ‘regionalised unitary state’. Due to these 
processes there are elements of political decentralisation at the regional 
level. The other dimensions of decentralisation which are typically dis-
cussed in the literature – functional and fiscal – are much weaker in the 
regions and more visible at the municipal tier.
The examples presented in this paper suggest that the most typical form 
of the Europeanization of regional policy making in Poland takes on the 
form of absorption (Börzell, Risse, 2008) or the thin learning process (Ra-
daelli, 2003), although the creation of institutions necessary for the imple-
mentation of ROPs may itself be seen as the accommodation process. The 
observation of thin learning concerns, for example, integrated strategic 
planning, which has most often been subordinate to the absorption of EU 
funds as the main (if not the only) objective of undertaking the prepara-
tion of the strategy. But it is also visible in the frequently adopted model 
of partnership or community involvement, which is undertaken primarily 
to comply with the formal requirements of the operating programmes. It 
does not mean that one could not identify examples of deeper learning 
(transformation), but the level of absorption is a dominant element of the 
picture.
There is no major debate about the changes in the central-regional or 
regional-local relations at the moment. The current power of Polish regi-
ons originates to a large extent from their role in the implementation of 
the European cohesion policy. However, indigenous regional functional, 
financial and political position is still very limited. It is also much less clear 
what their position would be if the stream of EU funds to be managed 
by regions were to shrink considerably. Currently, their role seems to be 
secure until the 2014–2020 EU financial perspective is over. There are 
plans that the role of the regions in the absorption of EU funds will be 
even larger than in the 2007–2013 period. The role of regional operating 
programmes is going to be enlarged, and regional governments will play a 
role in the implementation of certain other programmes as well. However, 
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the amount of EU funds at the disposal of Polish regions will most proba-
bly shrink dramatically very soon after 2020. Before this happens, Polish 
regions have to reinvent themselves and find other roles and sources of 
political power. One may say that using the opportunities provided by 
EU structural funds, the Polish regions have grown (as political actors) 
from ugly ducklings to very strong and powerful swans. Without reinven-
ting their role for the future they may easily shrink to ugly and unwanted 
ducklings again. 
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THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UGLY DUCKLING:  
POLISH REGIONS UNDER THE REALM  
OF EUROPEANIZATION
Summary
The article provides an analysis of the changing role of elected regional govern-
ments in regional policy making in Poland from their creation in 1998 until 
2013. The analysed period shows the gradual empowerment of regional govern-
ments. Initially they were established as politically, functionally and financial-
ly very weak institutions. Their political importance increased due to following 
major milestone decisions: (1) establishing NUTS-2 units identical with the 
territory of elected regional governments, (2) gaining a limited role in the im-
plementation of the Integrated Regional Operating Programme for 2004–2006 
(including decisions on the selection of individual projects), and (3) considera-
ble regional autonomy in the preparation and implementation of regional oper-
ating programmes for 2006–2013 and 2014–2020, involving about a quarter 
of all structural funds available for Poland. Therefore, the change, labelled as 
the process of ‘creeping regionalisation’, is explained through the Europeani-
zation of regional policy making. The situation in Poland is characterised by 
a much weaker position of regional governments than is the case in other CEE 
countries. No other new member states have NUTS-2 regions which are identical 
with self-governing regions, and in one of those countries ROPs are prepared or 
managed by elected regional governments. However, in policy-making practice, 
Europeanization at the regional level often has a character of thin learning or 
the absorption level (as opposed to the deeper transformation level). The article 
also raises the question of the role of regions following the end of EU 2014–2020 
financial perspective, calling for a reinvention of the role of regional institutions, 
and suggesting that the lack of long-term vision may result in a rapid decrease of 
the political profile of regions, to a level similar to the situation observed at the 
end of the 20th century. 
Key words: Europeanization, Poland, Central and Eastern Europe, regional-
isation, regions, regional policy, structural funds
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NEDOVRŠENA PRIČA RUŽNOG PAČETA:  
POLJSKE REGIJE U POSTUPKU EUROPEIZACIJE 
Sažetak
Analiziraju se promjene u ulozi koju jedinice regionalne samouprave u Poljskoj 
imaju u osmišljavanju regionalne politike u razdoblju od 1998. kada je regi-
onalna samouprava uspostavljena do 2013. Tijekom tog razdoblja dolazi do 
postupnog jačanja regionalne samouprave, u početku slabe kako s političkog, 
tako i s financijskog i funkcionalnog aspekta. Na političkoj je važnosti dobi-
la zbog tri važne odluke: (1) uspostave NUTS-2 jedinica, koje se prostorno 
poklapaju s jedinicama regionalne samouprave, (2) zadobivanja ograničene 
uloge u provođenju integriranog Regionalnog Operativnog Programa za razdo-
blje 2004.-2006. (uključujući i odlučivanje o odabiru pojedinih projekata) te 
(3) znatne neovisnosti na regionalnoj razini u pripremi i provedbi regionalnih 
operativnih programa za periode 2006.-2013. i 2014.-2020. na koje otpada 
otprilike četvrtina strukturnih fondova koji su na raspolaganju Poljskoj. Ta se 
promjena, nazvana polaganom regionalizacijom, objašnjava europeizacijom 
oblikovanja regionalne politike. Situaciju u Poljskoj obilježava daleko slabiji 
položaj regionalne samouprave nego što je to slučaj u ostalim zemljama srednje 
i istočne Europe. Ostale nove države članice nemaju NUTS-2 jedinice pro-
storno identične samoupravnim regijama, s tim da u jednoj od njih regionalne 
operativne programe pripremaju ili njima upravljaju izabrane regionalne vlasti. 
Ipak, kada se radi o kreiranju politike u praksi, europeizacija na regionalnoj 
razini često se odvija na površnoj razini, tj. razini apsorpcije, umjesto na dubljoj 
razini transformacije. Također se postavlja pitanje što će biti s ulogom regija 
po završetku financijske perspektive EU 2014.–2020. Regionalne institucije 
trebale bi pronaći nove uloge jer u protivnom bi manjak dugoročnog planiranja 
mogao rezultirati naglim opadanjem političke važnosti regija do razine slične 
onoj s kraja 20. stoljeća.   
Ključne riječi: europeizacija, Poljska, srednja i istočna Europa, regionalizaci-
ja, regije, regionalna politika, strukturni fondovi
